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SMALL BUSINESS
A FAVORITE assumption of American society is that commerce and industry
are grounded upon a free competitive system. In the picture of a nation of
individual businessmen operating independently and each for himself, monop-
olistic combination of any sort is necessarily out of place. Anti-trust laws
flourish, aimed to protect the "American Way" of competition-the inalien-
able right to compete in any field and to alter prices to meet the demands
of the market. The N.R.A. provided a brief interlude when the necessity
of paring some of competition's sharper claws was publicly recognized, but
its demise only led to a highly articulate reaction towards more strenuous
prosecution of monopolistic combinations. Directing the fanfare is not the
consumer but the small independent-the traditional beneficiary of free com-
petition, the ideal unit in the theoretical society that the anti-trust laws pre-
sumably perpetuate. For his own ends he preaches a philosophy of rugged
individualism and every man for himself. At the same time, and likewise
for his own ends, he is constantly seeking some form of stabilization to take
the risks out of business'-risks of reduced prices as a result of low-cost
competition, risks of reduced volume as a result of additional competition.
In the fight to limit competition the small business man has two chief enemies,
the large corporation above and the unfinanced individuals below, each threat-
ening the security of his middle class position. Like his larger corporate
counterpart he uses the means at hand to secure monopolistic stability; for
the wealthy corporation the means are economic combination, for the small
businessman, political combination.
On some fronts, his fight against large scale enterprise is familiar. In the
federal field, the Robinson-Patman Act,2 aimed in terms at "monopoly,"
attempts to eliminate much of the advantage in purchasing power formerly
wielded by the chain store systems and mail-order houses.3 The Miler-Tydings
amendment specifically excepts resale price fixing contracts from the bans
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,4 under which they had been condemned
for twenty-five years. Such legislation is but a wider expression of similar
action in the states, largely secured through the trade association activity
1. "'Most men who come to the Department of Justice, complaining of someone
else's price fixing, implore us to tell them how to 'stabilize' their own industry, which
is a polite term for restraining competition that they find it difficult to meet." Speech
by Robert H. Jackson at Sea Island, Georgia, May 28, 1937. An.oLD, FOLK.L.E or C,%ux-
TALIsM (1931) 212, n.
2. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1937).
3. See Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 447; ef. Hearinqs of Committee o1 the
Judiciary on H. R. 8442, H. R. 4995, and H. R. 5o62. 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 28, 217.
4. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (Supp. 1938), (1937) 6 Tm vz RE,.
RE1. 9.
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among independents which was given a new and probably permanent vitality
by the N.R.A.5 The new spirit is evidenced by a series of statutes designed
to eliminate price cutting by the small time chiseler as well as the huge retail
establishment. Under the mantle of the Miller-Tydings Act, resale price main-
tenance statutes 6 set as a price floor for all retailers the resale prices fixed
in a contract made by a manufacturer with any single retailer. Difficulties
of enforcement led to further implements in the form of Unfair Trade Practice
Acts fixing a bottom price at invoice cost plus a certain fixed mark-up. Per-
haps the most publicized penalties imposed on size have been the special taxes
on department and chain stores. Justification for the distinctions made is
found in the very form of business organization which makes it possible to
sell to the public below the prices of individual retailers.8
Such statutes seem strange when the vociferous demand of the trust haters
is for a less expensive system of distribution. Equally anomalous, but far less
familiar, are other measures which set up legislative barriers to protect one-
time monopolies from the encroachment of new methods of distribution. Typi-
cal of the checks applied to the tendency of powerful groups of retailers to
penetrate lines traditionally belonging to others, are several state re"taurant
laws.9 In Colorado, for example, in limiting the vending of food to estab-
lishments in which nothing but food, candy and tobacco is sold,10 the restau-
rateurs have rid themselves of the competition of the highspeed, low cost,
tipless meal service in drug, department and five and ten cent stores,11 and have
forced upon these competitors an obligation to remodel or yield to a monopoly
of restaurateurs.12
Another and more important once natural monopoly which has been per-
petuated in the face of the competition of more economical methods of dis-
tribution is that of the small town producer or storekeeper. Formerly, because
of his geographical position, his only competition was that of the wandering
peddler, the itinerant merchant, and the occasional new establishment. Now
a new competition threatens. National corporations distribute directly to
consumers through door-to-door solicitors. The large statewide producer,
taking advantage of fast trucks and good roads, delivers goods to a customer's
door, cutting into lines traditionally monopolized by the local baker, dry-
5. See Grether, Solidarity in the Distributive Trades hs Relation to the Conitrol
of Price Competition (1937) 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 375.
6. See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 672; Legis. (1936) 49 HArv. L. Rnv. 811.
7. See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1201.
8. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 619.
9. See Legis. (1937) 22 IowA L. REV. 736, 740.
10. Colo. Session Laws (1935) c. 118; Kress & Co. v. Johnson, 16 V. Supp. 5
(D. Colo. 1936), aff'd, 299 U. S. 511 (1936) ; In re Interrogatories of the Governor,
97 Colo. 587, 52 P. (2d) 663 (1935).
11. See Hanson, Restaurants (1934) 13 ENcYc. Soc. SciExcss 336.
12. Similar to this type of restriction is that imposed by the independent appliance
dealers upon utility companies' appliance sales. E.g., OxLA. STAT. (Marlow, 1931)
§§ 9726, 9727.
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cleaner, confectioner, launderer, and wholesaler.13 To meet the threat of this
competition the local businessman has sought to enlist a legislative weapon
-the ordinance making power delegated to nmunicipalities by the state, includ-
ing the power to prohibit nuisances, 14 to license certain occupations, 15 and
to tax for revenue. 16
But here the courts, often docile, were apt to balk. For with all these
powers runs the restriction that they must apply equally to all persons engaged
in the same activity. If ordinances are to escape the bans of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Anientment' 7 they must include no arbitrary
discriminations.' 8 For example, no ordinances could be aimed at a business
merely because it was new. The courts have had to warn that the power to
require bonds and license fees from itinerant vendors, once used to protect
consumers against the frauds of casual merchants and peddlers, 19 and to
secure to the city the taxes they avoided by dodging in and out of business
between assessments with "fire" and "bankruptcy" sales,20 may not be extended
to form a barrier to all new establishments by attributing to them elements
of itineracy.2 ' Another such discrimination was found to exist in an ordinance
which forbade the peddling of bakery products within 1000 feet of a bakery
and thereby set up a wall around the clientele of such shops. The court con-
13. See French, M1unicipal Tariffs Under the Guise of Occupalion Taxes (1933)
18 IowA L. REv. 342.
14. By declaring soliciting and peddling to be nuisances, ordinances stop the house-
to-house distribution of the national corporations as well as the usual peddlers. Green
River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; ef. Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Richmond, 298 Fed. 126 (N. D. Cal. 1924); Ratta v. Healy, 1 F. Supp. 669
(D. N. H. 1932).
15. Illustrative of the effectiveness of the licensing power was an ordinance taxing
sellers of bread baked outside of the city three times as much as resident bakeries. When
challenged, the ordinance was changed to one imposing a license fee of an equal amount
upon itinerant dealers in bread. This measure mas held valid. American Bakeries Co. v.
Opelika, 229 Ala. 388, 157 So. 206 (1934). License fees, however, must stay within
the uncertain bounds of reasonableness. Dugan Bros., Inc. v. Zorn, 149 Misc. 611,
261 N. Y. Supp. 592 (Sup. Ct 1932).
16. E.g., American Bakeries Co. v. Huntsville, 232 Ala. 612, 163 So. 8S0 (1935).
17. There are, of course, no "commerce clauses" in state constitutions to invalidate
these municipal tariff barriers. See (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1314, criticizing Duffin v.
Tucker, 113 Fla. 621, 153 So. 298 (1934). But ordinances have been declared invalid
for indefiniteness [Peterson Baking Co. v. Fremont, 119 Neb. 212, 228 N. IV. 256 (1931),
(1931) 9 NanB. L. BULL. 204], and as ultra vires and void under the authority granted
by the state. Ex pare Frank, 52 Cal. 606 (1878) ; see MlcQu.Lt-A, ' MUICIPAL Con-
PoRAnois (2d ed. 1928) 1087-1092.
18. Classifications must be " . . . based on a real and substantial difference having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.' Power 'Manufacturing
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 493 (1927).
19. Commonwealth v. Crowell, 156 Mass. 215, 30 N. E. 1015 (1S92).
20. Compare Louisville v. Sagalowski, 136 Ky. 324, 124 S. W. 339 (1910), with People
ex tel Moskowitz v. Jenkins, 202 N. Y. 53, 94 N. E. 1065 (1911).
21. Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 Atl. 193, 94 A. L. R. 1067 (1934).
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sidered it too patently intended merely to "eliminate some of the competition
between bakery stores and those peddling bakery products." 2 2 The defendant
"peddler" was a corporation distributing bakery products through several
counties. Again, members of the same business may not be arbitrarily sub-
classified on grounds of residency or nonresidency alone. In this respect
licensing ordinances sought to be set up by the local merchant against the
statewide distributor most commonly fail.23 For as between the two, each
delivering upon orders to the customer's door, the only distinction that can
be drawn seems to be the situs of the plants from which the trucks depart.
In a few instances the courts have found that a license tax differentiated upon
the maintenance or non-maintenance of a plant in the city does not amount
to a discrimination against non-residents,24 but the weight of authority is
to the contrary.
25
The court's prohibitions, however, have in many instances been ingeniotisy
evaded. Thus, although a distinction drawn on residence is arbitrary, one
drawn on a difference in the mode of conducting business is not. And for
the most part the situs of the plant is deemed one circumstance which may
so affect the nature of the business as to afford a basis of classification.20
In effect this amounts to a recognition of the validity of a discrimination
upon residence alone. For example, a license fee imposed on trucks deliver-
ing certain specified food products, but exempting those operating from a
resident food dealing establishment, was held to be reasonable in that the
costs of inspecting the vehicles varied.27 And the difference between col-
lecting clothing for dry cleaning outside the city limits and collecting clothing
at a plant within the city was held a sufficient basis for exacting a $200 fee
in the first instance and a $25 fee in the latter.28 Against the reasonableness
of such regulations it has been urged that a statewide merchant pays taxes
in his own city, that his hauling expenses make up for any advantage he may
22. N. Y. Dugan Bros., Inc. v. New York City, 7 N.Y. S. (2d) 162,163 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; cf. People v. Kuc, 272 N.Y. 72, 4 N. E. (2d) 939 (1936) (prohibition of peddling
newspapers in the street held unconstitutional).
23. Ward Baking Co. v. Fernandina, 29 F. (2d) 789 (D. Fla. 1928) Ex parle
Hart, 36 Cal. App. 627, 172 Pac. 610 (1918); O'Connell v. Kontajohn, 179 So. 802
(Fla. 1938) ; It re Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926) ; Hair v. Humboldt, 133
Kan. 67, 299 Pac. 268 (1931).
24. American Bakeries Co. v. Sumpter, 173 S. C. 94, 174 S. E. 919 (1934), appeal
dismissed, 293 U. S. 523 (1934); Campbell Baking Co. v. Harrisonville, 50 F. (2d)
670 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), (1931) 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 164.
25. See Ex parte Baker, 127 Tex. Cr. Rep. 589, 596, 78 S. W. (2d) 610, 614 (1935),
and cases cited supra note 23.
26. Richmond Linen Supply Co. v. Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S. E. 554 (1933),
aff'd, 291 U. S. 641 (1934) ; Vaughn v. Richmond, 165 Va. 145, 181 S. E. 372 (1935);
cf. Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. (2d) 405, 65 P. (2d) 884, 109 A. L, R. 895
(1937).
27. Jewel Tea Co. v. Troy, 80 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
28. Williams v. Bowling Green, 254 Ky. 11, 70 S.W. (2d) 967 (1934).
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have over a local merchant, that special burdens imposed by a municipal
legislature in which he is not represented are not subject to democratic
controls, and, finally, that such a provincial tariff and the local monopoly
which it protects are uneconomic. For their validity it is urged that the
statewide distributor must be expected to bear his share of the burdens
of local government, police protection and street improvement, since he is
its beneficiary in the profits he takes from his business within the city,
and that public policy requires the economic stability of the local merchant,
who pays taxes and wages to residents.29 The latter argument seems most
nearly to approach the true rationales behind such legislation and its success
in the courts. The interests of the non-vocal consumer go unconsidered as
against those of a pressure group which can identify itself with the public
interest.
The political fight against new distributing methods is not limited to sellers
of merchandise. Professional men deny that they engage in "trade" or in
restraints of trade.30 But the professions have their own pattern for pegging
the status quo and with it a traditional price level. Contemporary investi-
gation by the Department of Justice reveals the pressure exerted by the
Medical Association of the District of Columbia in opposition to group health
plans.3 1 Necessarily subject to comparable scrutiny must be the legal doc-
trines that have so long prohibited corporate practice in all the professions.
It is apparent that here, too,,is protection of a monopoly of a traditional
method and the price fixing implicit in a customary basis for the reckoning
of fees. The opponent in the fight is the corporation which would bring into
the professions a new method of distributing services and satisfy a demand
for lower professional prices. Chief legal weapon of the individualists is
the prohibition of "corporate practice" either ex-pressed in statute3 and
years of dicta,3 3 or implicit in a legalistic interpretation of the words of a
statute limiting practice to "licensed persons," a status which a corporate
person cannot attain. 34 On the social level vigorous arguments are made
29. Compare (1931) 5 So. CA.nIF. L. REX. 164, 166, with (1934) 43 YAE.n L. J. 1314;
(1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 323.
30. "Their first defense is that the anti-trust laws are directed against monopolies
in restraint of trade while the practice of medicine is in no sense a trade within the com-
monly accepted meaning of the term"' (1939) 112 J. Am. UMEIcAL Ass':: 53, 56 (quoting
reactions to the indictment of The fedical Association of the District of Columbia). See
also Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 436 (1932).
31. See DEP'T oF JusTicE, IvESTrGATrON OF MfEDCAL Socm=rEs, PurLic STI%==-;T
(Aug. 1938); (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 1193.
32. E.g., Law: ILL. AN-. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c.32, §411; N. Y. P=NM.
CODE § 280. Mcdichic: CAL. Bus. AND Pnop. CODE (Deering, 1937) §§ 2007, 2003.
33. See, e.g., In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 483, 92 N. - 15, 16 (1910);
State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 42, 103 N. ,V. 1078, 1079 (1905).
34. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d)
992 (1935) (medicine); People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers,
354 Ill. 102, 187 N. E. 823 (1933) (law); Iowa v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781,
234 N. V. 260 (1931) (dentistry).
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that by dividing loyalties corporate practice impairs the intimate personal
relationship which is fundamental to the practice of the professions, and
that commercialization is necessarily accompanied by a collapse of ethics.",
But the corporations affected by the prohibition vary considerably, There
is the department store which practices optometry in order to sell spectacles at
its optical goods counter,36 or the bank which draws up wills to be executed
by its own trust department.3 There are the dental parlors operated for
profit by laymen, where actual dental work is done by licensed dentist. and
where the lay director may or may' not exercise a substantial supervision
over the professional activities. 3s There may be a group of professional
men banded together to secure the benefits of a corporate organization, or
a non-profit cooperative corporation formed to extend the benefits of a
system of prepayments for professional services.3 9 Yet while in each varied
situation a different evaluation of the corporation's practice of the profession
should be made,40 the same ethical objections are raised, 41 obviously because
the threat of lower prices is common to all the corporate forms. 4"2 It is
evident that in many situations the rationalizations put forth against cor-
porate practice are not applicable. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that
the restraints on competition which are alleged to exist in the District of
Columbia may be only the extra-legal suasions 43 perfecting the monopoly
35. In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); Board of
Dental Examiners v. Miller, 90 Colo. 193, 8 P. (2d) 699 (1932). For an evaluation
of these arguments, see Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay
Agencies (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 69; Levy and Mermin, Cooperative Medicine and the
Law (1938) 1 NAT. LAWYERS GuiLD Q. 194; (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 346.
36. E.g., Neill v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 330 Pa. 213, 199 Atl. 178 (1938) (practice
forbidden).
37. E.g., State v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348
(1934) (practice forbidden); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280,
288 Pac. 157 (1930), (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 482.
38. E.g., Iowa v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931) (lay
supervision, practice forbidden) ; Painless Parker Dentist v. Board of Dental Examiners,
216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932) (lay supervision exercised only over business end,
dentist's license revoked).
39. See e.g., NEW PLANS OF MEDICAL SERVICE (Julius Rosenwald Fund, 1936);
Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Non Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility (1934)
2 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 119; NVeihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-Usefil but For-
bidden (1935) 3 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 296.
40. See (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 346; (1931) 44 Hav. L. REv. 1114.
41. See cases cited supra notes 35-38.
42. Professor Llewellyn recognizes that the "problem of unauthorized practice
of the law is a problem of using the processes of law to define and protect a monopoly."
Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles. Poultices-and Cures? (1938) 5 L w & CONTrUP.
PRoD. 104.
43. These suasions are being applied, perhaps coincidentally, in one of the few
instances where the legal attack on grounds of corporate practice has failed. Compare
Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. D.C. 1938), with State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938), petition for
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of a method of practicing and computing fees which the courts continue to
preserve by enjoining corporate professional practice, however socially desir-
able it might be.
In all of the legislative combinations in restraint of trade so far considered
-those of the independent retailer, the small town producer and the in-
dividual professional man-the struggle has taken on the aspect of the
individual versus the corporation which fits so nicely into the ideological
pattern of the American economic system. That the development of new
methods of distribution may be hindered and prices pegged is a byproduct
of relatively small moment, attracting little attention. But it is not only
against the corporate competitor that the individual businessman sets up
his protective legislative bulwark. Taking a cue from the licensing require-
ments fencing off the "professions, '114 many mere occupat'onal groups. "4 by
pretending a quasi-professional status, have effectively checked the number of
new competitors pressing up from the ranks of the untrained and unfinanced.
This form of political monopolism can be less easily reconciled with the
customary ideas of the public. But those adversely concerned, the unidentified
youth who is in effect banned from the calling and the consumer who has
to pay "standard prices," are not in a position to offer effective opposition.4 0
The protection of these adverse interests therefore falls solely to the courts,
Licensing statutes and other restrictions upon the right to pursue a lawful
occupation must first satisfy the criterion that the trade affected is one which
reasonably calls for regulation under the police power.4 - Here the courts
certiorari filed, 6 U. S. L.WK 504 (U. S. 1938). The two decisions are compared in
(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 346.
44. Dent -. West Virginia, 1-29 U. S. 114 (189) (medicine--public health); If: re
Investigation of Conduct of E-amination for Admission to Practice Law. 1 Cal. (2d)
61, 33 P. (2d) 829 (1934) (law-practice not a right but a statutory privilege) ; Douglas
v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1923) (dentistry-public health); McNaughton v. Johnson,
242 U. S. 344 (1917) (optometry-public health); State v. Hovorka, 100 Minn. 249,
110 N.IV. 870 (1907) (pharmacy). In State v. Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517 (1S97),
an examination requirement for all new physicians was unsuccessfully challenged as con-
travening an anti-monopoly clause of the state constitution.
45. For an imposing list of occupations regulated by licensing requirements in North
Carolina, see Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes
(1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 1, 2.
46. Typical of pressure group efficiency is the success story of the cosmeticians in
securing the enactment of licensing statutes setting up examination requirements. Fish-
bein, The Cult of Beauty (Feb. 1926) 7 Ammr.axc. MEnctRi 161.
47. "Police power can only be exercised to suppress, restrain or regulate the liberty
of individual action when such action is injurious to the public welfare." Replogle v.
Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 622, 267 S. V. 353, 354 (1924). Thus paperhangers cannot
be examined in the name of promoting the public health, safety and general welfare.
Dasch N% Jackson, 170 Ifd. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936). Nor may a bond and license be
required of cement contractors. State cx reL. Sampson v. Sheridan, 25 Wyo. 347, 170
Pac. 1 (1918). But tile contractors in North Carolina must pass licensing examinations
fixed by future competitors. N. C. CODE Ai. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §§5163(ggg),
5168(jjj).
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appear increasingly willing to follow the legislative determination. Thus
while at one time the power of the state to license plumbing 48 and horse-
shoeing4 9 was questioned, today the statutes apply not only to plumbers
but to barbers,50 contractors, 5 ' embalmers,52 even photographers. 3
The second, and more stringent test is that the regulation applied must
be "reasonable," not "arbitrary," in view of the public good to be served.
Commonly the regulations called for, although showing apparently haphazard
variations in the different trades, 54 follow a definite pattern. The applicant
may be subject to a training period, an examination, and a license fee. Thus
at the start the requirements may be such as effectively to dissuade the
person without financial backing from undertaking the campaign to enter
competition. For the training period may be long and set by statute, despite
dicta to the effect that competency is the element which affects the public
and hence is the only criterion that may be set up for licensing." ', Accord-
ingly beauty operators have been held to requirements of one year's train-
ing.56 A three years' apprenticeship for barbers has been held not excessive. 7
In New York City ten years' experience-or a college degree in science
and three years' experience -have been required of applicants for exanina-
tions for master plumbers' licenses.58 Moreover, the additional burden has
48. State ex -tl. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 Pac. 851 (1906).
49. I re Aubry, 36 Wash. 308, 78 Pac. 900 (1904).
50. People v. Logan, 284 Ill. 83, 119 N.E. 913 (1918).
51. Hunt v. Douglas Lumber Co., 41 Ariz. 276, 17 P. (2d) 815 (1933) (general
contractors-prevention of fraud); Milwaukee v. Rissling, 184 Wis. 517, 199 N. W. 61
(1924) (electrical contractors--public safety). Contra: Southeastern Electric Co. v.
Atlanta, 179 Ga. 514, 176 S. E. 400 (1934) (electrical contractors); Harrigan & Reid
Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 195 N. W. 60 (1923) (heating contractors).
52. Beard v. State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 111 Cal. App. 559,
295 Pac. 1052 (1931).
53. State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938), cert. denied, 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 182 (U. S. 1938), (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 128. Contra: Territory v. Kraft,
33 Hawaii 397 (1935) ; see Wright v. Wiles, 117 S.W. (2d) 736, 738 (Tenn. 1938).
Among the statutes that have gone unchallenged by judicial review are thosqe
regulating dry cleaners in North Carolina [N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, Supp. 1937)
§ 5382(3)], and licensing watchmakers in Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. (1937) §§ 125.01-
125.10; see note 73, infra.
54. See Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 45.
55. "What the public is interested to know is that the barber is competent. How
he has acquired his skill or knowledge is of minor importance." State v. Walker,
48 Wash. 8, 11, 92 Pac. 775, 776 (1907).
56. State ex rel. Dally v. Woodall, 225 Ala. 178, 142 So. 838 (1932).
57. The court thought such a long training period bordered on the unreasonable
and might be "intended to restrict and discourage the public from engaging in this
occupation," but sustained the law. People v. Logan, 284 I11. 83, 86, 119 N. E. 913,
914 (1918).
58. Benedetto v. Kern, 167 Misc. 831, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (Sup, Ct. 1938), af td,
7 N.Y. S. (2d) 227 (App. Div. .. Dept. 1938). It was argued that "this provision
lugging the plumbing industry into the regulation of the right of new people to engage
[Vol. 48 : 847
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been placed on the applicant in some cases that, during the training period,
charges may not be made for student services."9 Examples might he multi-
plied to demonstrate the whittling away of the judicial prohibition of a
requirement that makes a particular form of acquiring skill and knowledge
essential. The force of that expression remains only to invalidate provisions
that the'experience be gained under certain licensed mastersl and require-
ments of facility in a related vocation, such as embalm;ng in the case of
undertakers.6 '
Upon completing his training the applicant may be faced with an examina-
tion prepared by a board made up entirely of members of the trade, whose
interests are opposed to the admission of new competitors.,- Accordance with
the general legislative criteria set up is required, and the courts limit the
scope of examinations to subject matter affecting the public health, welfare,
or safety.6 3 Thus it has been held that an examination for barbers may
not emphasize tonsorial aptitude and the care of tools instead of cleanliness.@4
But within the bounds of the statute the examination may be so difficult
as to enable only three per cent of applicants to pass, as in the case of one
test for plumbers. 5 Beauty operators have been held to a technical knowledge
in competition as Master Plumbers is a fascist method of control which should be
allowed no headway in our democracy." Brief for Petitioners, p. 35.
59. State v. Couragen, 54 R. I. 256, 171 Ati. 326 (1934). Contra: M[oler v. Whis-
man, 243 Mfo. 571, 147 S.W. 985 (1912).
60. Hoff v. State, 197 Atl. 75 (Del. Super. Ct. 1938) (cosmetologists) ; People
v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. . 451 (1910) (undertakers) ; Marxv. Maybury, 30 F.
(2d) 839 (NV. D. Wash. 1929) (barbers).
61. Wyeth v. Board of Health, 200 fass. 474, 86 N. E. 925 (1909); State v. Rice,
115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026 (1911).
62. State cx rel. felton v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. IV. (2d) 601 (1930).
But cf. "Under some of the acts . . . members of the board of health form part of the
examining board, but our act has not even this saving grace. By its terms two master
plumbers and one journeyman plumber are constituted the guardians of the public
health and welfare. We are not permitted to inquire into the motive of the Legislature,
and yet why should a court blindly declare that public health is involved when all the
rest of mankind know full well that the control of the plumbing business by the board
and its licensees is the sole end in view?" Rudkin, J. in State ex rel. Richey v. Smith,
42 Wash. 237, 248, 84 Pac. 851, 854 (1906).
63. State ex reL Winkler v. Benzenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. XV. 345 (1893);
Timmons v. forris, 271 Fed. 721 (V. D. Wash. 1921).
64. Timmons v. Mforris, 271 Fed. 721 (AV. D. Wash. 1921). But cf. TEx. A.
PENT. CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 734a § 9, (requiring histology of hair, skin, muscles
and nerves; structure of head, face, neck; elementary chemistry of sterilization; diseases
of skin and hair; massage, haircutting, bleaching and dyeing of hair). This statute
survived an attack on other grounds. Gerard v. Smith, 52 S. AV. (2d) 347 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932).
65. Brief for Petitioners, p. 2, Benditto v. Kern, 167 Misc. 831, 4 N. Y. S. (2d)
844 (Sup. Ct. 1938). It may be noted that the difficulty of examinations for admisSion
to the professions is a repeated complaint, as in California, when only 28.5,Cc of appli-
cants passed the bar examinations. In re Investigation of Conduct of Examination,
1 Cal. (2d) 61, 67, 33 P. (2d) 829, 831 (1934).
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of the anatomy of the skin and muscles of the neck and face as well as to
recognition of certain skin diseases.0 0  Physical examinations are often re-
quired ;67 moral and age qualifications are laid down. 8
Finally upon payment of an original license fee varying from five to fifty
dollars, 9 the applicant becomes entitled to compete as a member of the
trade. In some trades, notably plumbing and barbering, still further guild-
like distinctions have been attempted between employing or master-tradesmen
and journeymen. But obviously distinctions between tradesmen already
meeting the demands of public health cannot be grounded on the police
power.70 When such further requirements reach the courts they are gener-
ally held unconstitutional. Accordingly, discrimination in the form of an
equal tax put upon "each individual firm or corporation doing a plumbing
business" has been held invalid as forcing individual plumbers out of business
and into the employ of well-established firms.71
Even within the closed occupational group, however; the individual may
not have a free right to compete. If he is a barber, ordinances prescribing
hours of business may prevent him from staying open late to secure patron-
age.72 His privilege of reducing prices to gain first customers may be limited
66. TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1925) art. 734b, § 9.
67. Hanzal v. San Antonio, 221 S.W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
68. The greater necessity of "good moral character" in the licensed trades of
watchmaking, barbering, and photography than in the unlicensed occupations is difficult
to rationalize. In State ex rel. Allen v. Davis, 119 S.W. (2d) 844 (Mo. App. 1938),
a practicing barber's license was revoked partly upon the ground that he had a prison
record.
69. See Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 45, at 5.
70. Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. J26, 184 Atl. 914 (1936). Similarly a state cannot
impose an examination upon journeymen and exempt master employers. State ex rel.
Chapel v. Justus, 90 Minn. 474, 97 N. W. 124 (1903) ; cf. State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio
St. 599, 51 N. E. 136 (1898).
71. Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 767, 772, 47 So. 465, 466 (1908). The court asked
"why should a tax of $50 be levied on the plumber for the right to labor and a tax
of $10 on the lawyer, the dentist, or other professional man? The answer is easy. It
was done to make it possible to monopolize the business." Cf. State v. Foss, 147 Minn.
281, 180 N.W. 104 (1920).
72. Feldman v. City of Cincinnati, 20 F. Supp. 531 (S. D. Ohio 1937), (1938)
7 Gwo. WAsn. L. REv. 242; Wilson v. Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N. E. 187
(1935) ; (1935) 10 U. OF CiN. L. Rr v. 182. But despite arguments that such regulations
aid inspection and offer the only method of controlling hours of labor in the trade,
the majority rule holds such measures invalid in the barbering trade as in other ordinary
legitimate businesses. Oklahoma City v. Johnson, 82 P. (2d) 1057 (Okla. 1938); Armi-
trano v. Barbaro, 1 A. (2d) 109 (R. I. 1938); cf. Justensen's Food Stores v. Tulan,
84 P. (2d) 140 (Cal. 1938) ; Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51 (1915) (nier-
cantile businesses) ; Brown v. Seattle, 150 Wash. 203. 272 Pac. 517 (1928) (closing meat
shops at 6 P.M.).
For certain types of occupations, closing regulations are generally thought justified
to protect public morals or welfare. Tarkio v. Cook, 120 IfMo. 1, 25 S. W. 202 (1894)
(billiard hall) ; State v. Calloway, 11 Idaho 719, 84 Pac. 27 (1906) (saloon) ; Churchill
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by prices fixed according to statute by 75% of the members of the trade
in his locality. Such statutes have been upheld by the supreme courts of
Louisiana and Oklahoma, on what amounts to the tenuous rationale that
the cleanliness of barber shops demands a guarantee of income to barbers."
Through these varying statutes and ordinances, the police powers of the
states are being manipulated by pressure groups of small businessmen to
bulwark their economic status with legislative monopoly. The suppressed
competitor has no effective weapon. He has attacked such monopolies in
the courts with arguments based on the Fourteenth Amendment. But for
the most part, he has failed. Courts are not traditionally empowered to
look behind the ostensible purpose of such legislation to its true designs. 7"
If a statute purports to meet a public need and the measures are related to
the stated purposes in the slightest degree, the courts have in this field,-
perhaps more than elsewhere,7" refrained from questioning the opinion of
v. Albany, 65 Ore. 442, 133 Pac. 632 (1913) (soft drink parlor); Hyman v. Boldrick,
153 Ky. 77, 154 S. V. 369 (1913) (pawnshop) ; Clein -. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 529, 139 S. F.
46 (1927) (auction sales). As to Sunday laws for business, see Ex tarte Scaranino, 7
Cal. (2d) 309, 60 P. (2d) 288 (1936), (1937) 12 WNAsH. L. RLv. 82.
73. [errin v. Arnold, 82 P. (2d) 977 (Okla. 1938); Board of Barber Examiners
v. Parker, 190 La. 214, 182 So. 485 (193S). But cf. In re Kazas, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 161,
70 P. (2d) 962 (1937).
The Louisiana statute brought about a remarkable attempt at evasion, as reported
in N. Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1939, p. 4, col. 2. "Mo.nou. La., Jan. 23 (A.P.) - Luring
haircuts with hamburgers has brought fines of $25 each for T. C. Moore and two
employees in his barber shop and restaurant. judge David L Garrett convicted Moore
and his two barbers yesterday of giving a coupon good for one hamburger with each
50 cents of barber trade, thereby violating a State law permitting a majority of barbers
in a district to fix prices. The court suspended the sentences after warning the defendants
not to mix the culinary and tonsorial arts."
A unique device to stop price competition by prohibiting the display of prices except
within a shop was declared unconstitutional in People v. Osborne, 1Z Cal. App. (2d)
771, 59 P. (2d) 1083 (1936). But many licensing statutes, like one regulating watch-
makers, provide for the revocation of licenses for "unethical conduct:' such as adver-
tising of prices, giving away crystals free, repairing at less than cost "in order to
advertise or increase watch repair business," etc. Wis. STAT. (1937) § 125.03. Compare
the attacks launched in the name of the insurance laws against enterprising merchants
in Ollendorf Watch Co. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 73, 300 X. Y. Supp. 1175 (3d Dep't 1937)
and State ex rel. Duffy, Att'y Gen. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163,
16 N. E. (2d) 256 (1938), (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 117.
74. "The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assump-
tion that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted:' *1cCray
v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 56 (1904).
75. "The question whether the provisions of the statute here challenged will promote
and protect the public health [is) fairly debatable. Such being the factual situation
we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the legislature . . . " Kress & Co. v.
Johnson, 16 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D. Colo. 1938).
76. Cf. "It is an established principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may
not be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted."
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the legislatures. A possible alternative weapon is the use of anti-trust legis-
lation. The applicability of the federal laws is of course limited to interstate
commerce.7 7 But, at least against municipal ordinances, an attack predicated
upon one of the thirty-five state anti-trust laws might prove a more dramatic
method of bringing home to the courts the true purposes underlying the
regulations.78 Remedy by counter-legislation can scarcely be hoped for. The
restrained competitors are unorganized, while consumers who should be
their natural allies are apathetic, if not actually sympathetic toward the
nominal aims of the statutes.
The situation is virtually remediless, and the existence of protected legis-
lative monopolism side by side with an ideal of free competition will probably
continue so long as the organized independent can successfully identify his
interests with those of the public. Considered functionally, there is no anomaly
in this superficial inconsistency. For even the very anti-trust laws in which
"free competition" finds consummation are revealed in the final analysis only
as further legislative protection for the independent against the economic
combinations and monopolies which result from wholly free competition. But
until cooperation among the independents in the interest of self-protection
is openly recognized as inevitable, the restrictions laid down will remain
haphazard and unfair. At present an ideological fog effectively prevents any
progress toward intelligent regulation.
United States v. Butler, 297 US. . 1, 68 (1935). "In the Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U. S. 20, and in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, this court had before it statutes
which purported to be taxing measures. But their purpose was found to be to regulate
the conduct of manufacturing . . . in the states . . . an unconstitutional abuse
of the power to tax." 297 U. S. 1, at 70.
77. No cases have been found wherein monopolistic licensing ordinances have been
attacked as violating the anti-trust acts, although the "burden on interstate com-
merce" argument is often pleaded. E.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Troy, Ill., 80 F.
(2d) 366 (C. C..A. 7th, 1935).
78. Again, there are no cases in which discriminatory ordinances were so attacked.
The true designs behind the regulations have not been ignored by some judges, however.
E.g., Peckham, J., dissenting, People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison,
144 N. Y. 529, 543, 39 N. E. 686, 690 (1895) ; Rudkin, J., quoted supra note 62; Wilby
v. State, 93 Miss. 767, 771, 47 So. 465, 466 (1908); cf. State v. Call, 121 N. C. 643,
28 S. E. 517 (1897), cited supra note 44.
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